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FORSYTHE V. CLARK USA, INC.: CONTRADICTIONS
IN PARENT CORPORATION LIABILITY
IN ILLINOIS
INTRODUCTION
In 2007, the Illinois Supreme Court created a new avenue of recov-
ery for employees injured on the job.1 By statute, employees in Illi-
nois may not pursue common law causes of action against their
employers for injuries sustained during the course of their employ-
ment.2 Instead, employees or their estates are required to seek com-
pensation under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act (the Act). 3
The Act is intended to balance the interests of injured employees and
the financial interests of employers. To protect employees, the Act
presumes liability on the part of employers and forces employers to
bear the cost of employee injuries regardless of the requirements of
common law causes of action. 4 To protect employers, the Act limits
the amount that an employee can recover, depending on the specific
characteristics of the injury, and serves "'as the employee's exclusive
remedy if he sustains a compensable injury."' 5
In Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., the Illinois Supreme Court opened a
backdoor that allows plaintiffs to obtain compensation through direct
participant liability, in addition to recovery under the Act.6 Direct.
1. See Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 864 N.E.2d 227 (II. 2007).
2. The relevant part of the statute reads:
No common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer, his insurer,
his broker, any service organization retained by the employer, his insurer or his broker
to provide safety service, advice or recommendations for the employer or the agents or
employees of any of them for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged
in the line of his duty as such employee, other than the compensation herein provided,
is available to any employee who is covered by the provisions of this Act, to any one
wholly or partially dependent upon him, the legal representatives of his estate, or any
one otherwise entitled to recover damages for such injury.
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/5 (2004).
3. See id.
4. Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 240 (citing Gannon v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. Ry., 150
N.E.2d 141 (I11. 1958)).
5. See id. at 241 (quoting McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 423 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981)).
6. See generally William 0. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through
Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193 (1929) (presenting an early articulation of the idea of
parent corporation liability for torts committed against an employee of the subsidiary). See also
United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 64 (1998); Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 233.
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participant liability7 exists where stock ownership gives a parent cor-
poration the power to perform direct actions through a subsidiary. 8 A
parent corporation is subject to liability when there is a nexus between
the harm and the parent corporation's actions that makes liability di-
rect, not vicarious.9 Direct participant liability is an exception to the
general rule that a parent company is not liable for the torts of its
subsidiaries because it enables injured employees of a subsidiary cor-
poration to recover from a parent corporation. 10
Other courts have recognized direct participant liability as a valid
theory of tort liability." However, in joining those jurisdictions, the
Forsythe court overlooked two key related points in its decision. First,
the court failed to recognize that the facts before it presented a weak
case for direct participant liability.' 2 Other courts, faced with similar
facts, chose to avoid ruling on the theory's validity. 13 Instead, those
courts held that a parent corporation's acts of budgetary control over
a subsidiary cannot form the sole basis for liability. 14 Second, ac-
cepting a budget-based theory as the basis for direct liability blurred
the difference between direct and vicarious liability for corporations
and compounded confusion in an already confusing area of corporate
law.' 5
7. The Forsythe court consistently used this term to describe the plaintiffs' theory of liability.
864 N.E.2d at 232. A survey of some of the authorities cited in Forsythe reveals that the termi-
nology the courts use varies slightly. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 65 ("It is this direct liability that
is properly seen as being at issue here."); Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739, 757 (7th Cir.
1989) ("[Hlolding a parent corporation liable for 'directly participating' in its subsidiary's deci-
sionmaking is fundamentally different from holding an unrelated third party liable for acting in
concert with, or aiding and abetting, the subsidiary's misconduct."); Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v.
RLG, Inc., 755 N.E.2d 556, 559 (Ind. 2001) (holding that a corporate officer could be individu-
ally liable "as a direct participant under general legal principles"); Estate of Countryman v.
Farmers Co-op. Ass'n, 679 N.W.2d 598, 604 (Iowa 2004) (recognizing liability for a corporate
manager under a "participation in tortious conduct standard").
8. Douglas & Shanks, supra note 6, at 209.
9. Id.
10. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 61-62 ("Thus it is hornbook law that 'the exercise of control which
stock ownership gives to the stockholders ... will not create liability beyond the assets of the
subsidiary."' (citing Douglas & Shanks, supra note 6, at 196)).
11. See id. at 65; Esmark, 887 F.2d at 757; Estate of Countryman, 679 N.W.2d at 604; RLG, 755
N.E.2d at 559.
12. See Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 238-40.
13. See Coastal Corp. v. Torres, 133 S.W.3d 776, 779 (Tex. App. 2004); Waste Mgmt. Inc. v.
Super. Ct., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 910, 914-16 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). In its brief to the court, Clark
USA urged the court to follow the Texas and California decisions. Opening Brief of Defendant-
Appellant Clark USA, Inc. at 21-23, Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d 227 (No. 101570).
14. Coastal Corp., 133 S.W.3d at 779; Waste Mgmt., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 914-15.
15. See Douglas & Shanks, supra note 6, at 195 ("The statement that the insulation will be
broken down when the subsidiary is an 'agency,' 'adjunct,' 'instrumentality,' 'alter ego,' 'tool,'
'corporate double,' or 'dummy' of the parent is not helpful. These concepts themselves need
defining. At best they merely state results."); Cindy A. Schipani, The Changing Face of Parent
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In light of these errors, the more prudent course would have been
to require a subsidiary employee to "pierce the corporate veil" as a
prerequisite to recovery from a parent corporation.1 6 An examination
of the Illinois rules for direct participant liability and piercing the cor-
porate veil reveals that they seek to accomplish similar goals. 17 But,
as an equitable remedy, veil piercing provides courts a greater degree
of latitude. Additionally, courts will have even more flexibility in veil
piercing cases if Illinois relaxes the standard for veil piercing against
parent corporations as some commentators have suggested.18 This ap-
proach preserves a plaintiff's ability to recover from a parent corpora-
tion and clarifies the level of exposure for parent corporations that
face lawsuits from employees of their subsidiaries.
This Note analyzes the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Forsythe
and addresses potential issues that courts and practitioners face as a
result. Part II provides a general background of corporate liability
law, focusing on how the law affects the relationship between parent
and subsidiary corporations. 19 Part III includes an overview of the
Forsythe case.20 Part IV analyzes the court's decision to recognize di-
rect participant liability in a case where the plaintiffs primarily alleged
budgetary mismanagement, and Part IV then analyzes the court's con-
cept of direct participant liability in relation to the already complex
area of corporate liability.21 Finally, Part V addresses the impact of
the Forsythe decision on future cases of its kind and the liability of
parent corporations in Illinois for torts against employees of subsidi-
ary corporations.22 This Note demonstrates that Forsythe was the
wrong case to recognize direct participant liability. This Note also ar-
and Subsidiary Corporations: Enterprise Theory and Federal Regulation, 37 CONN. L. REV. 691,
696 (2005).
16. See Peetoom v. Swanson, 778 N.E.2d 291, 294-95 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) ("The doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil is an equitable remedy; it is not itself a cause of action but rather is a
means of imposing liability on an underlying cause of action, such as a tort or breach of con-
tract." (citing In re Rehab. of Centaur Ins. Co., 606 N.E.2d 291, 296 (Il. App. Ct. 1992))).
17. Compare Fontana v. TLD Builders, Inc., 840 N.E.2d 767, 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) ("Such
liability arises from fraud or injustice perpetrated not on the corporation but on third persons
dealing with the corporation." (internal citation omitted)), with Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 237 ("[I]f
a parent company mandates an overall course of action and then authorizes the manner in which
specific activities contributing to that course of action are undertaken, it can be liable for fore-
seeable injuries.").
18. See Philip I. Blumberg & Kurt Strasser, Corporate Groups and Enterprise Liability: Con-
tracts and Torts, in PROTECTING THE CORPORATE PARENT 1992: AVOIDING LIABILIY FOR AcTs
OF THE SUBSIDIARY 171, 197-98 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
B-785, 1992).
19. See infra notes 23-79 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 80-149 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 150-209 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 210-232 and accompanying text.
2009] 1085
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1083
gues that the court's concept of direct participant liability creates un-
certainty in corporate liability law and that the court should have
applied the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.
II. CORPORATE LIABILITY CONTEXT
Section A discusses the relationship between subsidiary and parent
corporations in order to better understand Clark USA's relationship
to its subsidiary.23 Next, Section B discusses the benefits of limited
liability for corporations24 and situations in which parent corporations
have been vicariously and directly liable for actions of their subsidiar-
ies.25 Section C provides an overview of direct participant liability
and the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. 26 Section D concludes
with an analysis of two cases that were factually similar to Forsythe
where the courts declined to apply direct participant liability.27
A. Parent-Subsidiary Corporate Structure
A subsidiary corporation is a corporation "in which another corpo-
ration, a parent corporation, owns a majority of the shares of its
stock. '28 Because some parent companies exist for the sole purpose
of owning controlling shares in subsidiary corporations, the term
"holding company" is sometimes used interchangeably with parent
corporation. 29 A benefit of complete or majority stock ownership is
that it allows the parent corporation to wield a large degree of control
over the subsidiary.30 The parent-subsidiary structure became com-
monplace over the course of the twentieth century, which allowed cor-
porations to expand in a way that led one commentator to compare
the largest corporations to economic "nation states." 31
23. See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 41-56 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 57-79 and accompanying text.
28. 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 41 (2007).
29. Id. ("'[HIolding corporation' has been used in various senses ranging from that of a corpo-
ration organized and operated for the sole purpose of holding a controlling interest in the stock
of one or more other corporations to that of an ordinary company which quite incidentally owns
stock in another corporation.").
30. Id.; Douglas & Shanks, supra note 6, at 196 Schipani, supra note 15, at 694 ("[A]lthough
some subsidiaries operate as truly separate businesses, they more often than not operate as part
of a totally integrated business enterprise." (citing Blumberg & Strasser, supra note 18)).
31. Phillip I. Blumberg, Accountability of Multinational Corporations: The Barriers Presented
by Concepts of the Corporate Juridical Entity, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 297, 297
(2001) ("Large multinational corporations have come to dominate the national and global eco-
nomic scene. The scale of their operations is enormous. The largest have grown into enterprises
1086
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B. Limited Liability and Its Boundaries
A number of factors motivate businesses to utilize the parent-sub-
sidiary corporate structure, such as "retention of the good will of an
established business unit" and "increased facility in financing. ' 32 Ad-
ditionally, the corporate structure allows parent corporations to limit
potential tort and contract liability by performing some operations
through a subsidiary corporation. 33 But limited liability has not al-
ways been the rule. During the early nineteenth century, state legisla-
tures exposed shareholders to unlimited liability.34 However, the
states quickly decided that limited liability encouraged investment and
led to greater economic expansion. 35 Contrary to the pejorative de-
piction of limited liability as a shield for large corporations, late-nine-
teenth- and early-twentieth-century state legislatures viewed limited
liability as a means of lowering the costs of market entry for small
businesses, which were less able to absorb the risks of unlimited liabil-
ity than the industrial titans of that era.36 Modern commentators rely
on the similar argument that limited liability facilitates investment by
reducing costs and risks for shareholders. 37
A parent corporation, as shareholder, has limited liability for the
actions of its subsidiary in the same manner as an individual share-
holder who owns shares of the subsidiary.38 In certain instances, how-
of astonishing magnitude that in their economic dimensions are fully comparable to nation
states.").
32. Douglas & Shanks, supra note 6, at 193.
33. 13 ILL. LAW & PRACTICE Corporations § 9 (2000) ("[Slhareholders, directors, and officers
of a corporation are not, as a general rule, liable for the corporation's debts and obligations.");
Douglas & Shanks, supra note 6, at 193 ("The reasons for the use of this structure are mani-
fold .... [T]he desire for limited liability ... has been ... one among many factors."); Schipani,
supra note 15, at 693.
34. Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability, Democ-
racy, and Economics, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 148, 155 (1992).
35. Id. ("[T]he furthering of capital formation could best be accomplished by encouraging
shareholders to invest through limiting their liability.").
36. Id. at 155-56.
37. See generally id. (analyzing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE Eco-
NOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1992)). Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel pro-
vide a number of justifications for limited liability in the context of the publicly held corporation,
such as lower monitoring costs of managers and other shareholders, "free transfer of shares,"
and allowing investors to diversify more easily. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra, at 41-44.
38. Professor Blumberg explains the parallel between parent corporations and shareholders
for purposes of corporate liability:
Identical protection has traditionally been accorded to the shareholder who is merely
an investor in the corporate business and to the shareholder-parent company in a com-
plex corporate group, which is itself engaged in the conduct of the business of the
group, although the relationships of these two very different types of shareholders to
the enterprises are universes apart.
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ever, courts will hold a parent corporation liable for the acts of a
subsidiary. Professor Robert Thompson identified nine characteristics
of parent corporation action (or inaction) that courts use to hold par-
ent corporations vicariously liable: "(1) undercapitalization; (2) fail-
ure to follow corporate formalities; (3) overlap of corporate records,
functions or personnel; (4) shareholder domination; (5) intertwining;
(6) lack of substantive separation; (7) agency; (8) fraud or misrepre-
sentation; and (9) general conclusory terms such as instrumentality or
alter ego."'39 Thus, parent corporations may face derivative liability in
a variety of scenarios, and parent corporations are wise to follow
traditional corporate formalities to avoid liability for the acts of their
subsidiaries. 40
C. Theories of Liability: Direct Participant and
Piercing the Corporate Veil
Courts have long recognized direct participant liability as a theory
for holding parent corporations, shareholders, corporate officers, or
others similarly situated liable for acts for which the corporation or
subsidiary is ostensibly responsible.41 Many federal42 and state courts
Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 283, 288 (1990).
39. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil Within Corporate Groups: Corporate Shareholders
as Mere Investors, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 379, 387 (1999) (presenting the results of a study of
factors present in cases where courts have to decide whether to pierce the corporate veil).
40. Douglas & Shanks, supra note 6, at 196-97 (recommending the following four guidelines
to "keep the business units from being treated as assimilated": (1) set up a separate financial
unit; (2) separate the day to day business of the parent and the subsidiary; (3) maintain formal
barriers between the management structures; and (4) do not represent the two units as one);
Thompson, supra note 39, at 387.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 65 (1998) (holding that a parent corpora-
tion could be directly liable for its actions that violate the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980); Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739, 757 (7th
Cir. 1989) (holding that, in proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board, a parent
corporation could be held directly liable for participating in the unlawful conduct of its subsidi-
ary); Estate of Countryman v. Farmers Co-op. Ass'n, 679 N.W.2d 598, 604 (Iowa 2004) (holding
that managers of limited liability companies in Iowa could be personally liable when they di-
rectly participated in the wrongdoing of the company); Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v. RLG, Inc., 755
N.E.2d 556, 559 (Ind. 2001) (holding that officers and shareholders in Indiana could be directly
liable for the company's actions under the responsible corporate officer doctrine).
42. It is worth noting that federal courts apply direct participant liability not only in suits
where they exercise diversity jurisdiction, but also in instances where federal statutory or admin-
istrative law is at issue. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51; Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'l
Pension Fund v. Elite Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d 1031, 1038 (7th Cir. 2000); Rodney B. Griffith &
Thomas M. Goutman, A Hiccup in Federal Common Law Jurisprudence: Sosa, Bestfoods and
the Supreme Court's Restraints on Development of Federal Rules of Corporate Liability, 14 U.
MIAMI Bus. L. Rav. 359, 390-408 (2006) (discussing the use of federal common law in interpret-
ing federal statutes). See generally Schipani, supra note 15 (discussing the effect of veil piercing
and direct liability theories on the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
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accept direct participant liability, or a theory similar to it.43 The
United States Supreme Court approved the use of direct participant
liability in a case where it interpreted the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), which
imposes liability on the "operator" of a facility that violates environ-
mental laws.44 The Court held that a parent company could be liable
as a direct participant under CERCLA because the term "operator"
indicates that anyone who was responsible for running a violating fa-
cility faces liability for environmental violations.45 In Esmark, Inc. v.
NLRB, the Seventh Circuit held that direct participant liability is ap-
plicable where the parent company exercised control over the situa-
tion that caused the litigation.46  Direct participant liability also
appears in cases involving corporate officers.47 The Indiana Supreme
Court applied direct participant liability in a case where it held that a
corporate officer could be liable for violating state environmental laws
because of his "active involvement" in the violations.48
The Illinois Supreme Court first confronted direct participant liabil-
ity in Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc.49 Previously, piercing the corporate
veil was the most common means of recovering from a parent corpo-
ration in an Illinois tort action. 50 From a plaintiff's perspective, pierc-
ing the corporate veil is an unattractive option when attempting to
reach the deep pockets of a parent corporation because courts are
often reluctant to allow veil piercing. 51 Consequently, parent corpora-
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA)).
43. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 65; Esmark, 887 F.2d at 757; Estate of Countryman, 679 N.W.2d at
604; RLG, 755 N.E.2d at 559.
44. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66.
45. Id. at 65 ("If any such act of operating a corporate subsidiary's facility is done on behalf of
a parent corporation, the existence of the parent-subsidiary relationship under state corporate
law is simply irrelevant to the issue of direct liability.").
46. 887 F.2d at 757 ("It is solely where a parent disregards the separate legal personality of its
subsidiary (and the subsidiary's own decisionmaking 'paraphernalia'), and exercises direct con-
trol over a specific transaction, that derivative liability for the subsidiary's unfair labor practices
will be imposed.").
47. See Estate of Countryman, 679 N.W.2d at 604; RLG, 755 N.E.2d at 559.
48. RLG, 755 N.E.2d at 563 ("A corporate officer may, however, be held personally liable if
he was actively involved in the activity that violates the statute." (citing United States v. Conser-
vation Chem. Co., 733 F. Supp. 1215, 1221 (N.D. Ind. 1989))).
49. 864 N.E.2d 227, 232 (Ill. 2007) ("[T]he theory of direct participant liability presented here
has not previously been addressed in Illinois. It has been addressed in other states and through-
out the federal courts, however.").
50. See 13 ILL. LAW & PRACTICE Corporations §§ 9-11 (2000); see also Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at
233 ("Defendant contends that unless the standards for piercing the corporate veil are met, a
parent company cannot be held liable for the negligence of its subsidiary.").
51. 13 ILL. LAW & PRACrICE Corporations § 9 (2000); see also Schipani, supra note 15, at 700
("A veil piercing claim requires rather egregious circumstances to prevail.").
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tions in Illinois face a larger pool of potentially successful tort plain-
tiffs after Forsythe.52
Courts pierce the corporate veil as an equitable remedy when
shareholders or management personnel should, in the interests of eq-
uity, bear responsibility for a corporation's obligations.5 3 Veil piercing
involving a parent corporation is an exceptional remedy because "in
general, a parent corporation may not be held to account for the lia-
bilities of a subsidiary unless the legal separateness of parent and sub-
sidiary has been disregarded in a wide range of corporate matters. ' 54
Where no separation exists between the parent and the subsidiary,
courts often label the subsidiary corporation an "alter-ego" or "instru-
mentality" of the parent corporation. 55 Accordingly, piercing the cor-
porate veil against a parent corporation is appropriate when the
parent corporation is actually running the subsidiary and it is unjust
for the parent corporation to hide behind the corporate form to es-
cape liability.56
D. The Proper Path: Waste Management and Coastal Corp.
This Section outlines the decisions in Waste Management Inc. v. Su-
perior Court of San Diego County 57 and Coastal Corp. v. Torres.58
Waste Management and Coastal Corp. illustrate the alternative path
available to the Illinois Supreme Court in Forsythe.59 Waste Manage-
ment and Coastal Corp. are factually similar to Forsythe, and the hold-
ings set a clear limit on parent corporations' liability for exercising
budgetary control over subsidiaries.
In Waste Management, the dispute arose from the death of an em-
ployee of Waste Management of California, Inc. (WMCI), a subsidiary
of Waste Management, Inc. and USA Waste of California (collectively
WMI). 60 The employee's family sued the parent company for negli-
52. Jeremy LaMarche, Cost-Cutting Schemes Could End up Costing Parent Corporations, 19
Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 505, 508 (2007).
53. See 13 ILL. LAW & PRACTiCE Corporations § 9 (2000); Peetoom v. Swanson, 778 N.E.2d
291, 295 (I11. App. Ct. 2002) ("Such liability arises from fraud or injustice perpetrated not on the
corporation but on third persons dealing with the corporation."). Note also that veil piercing is a
means of assessing liability for an underlying cause of action. Peetoom, 778 N.E.2d at 295.
54. Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739, 753 (7th Cir. 1989).
55. See Peetoom, 778 N.E.2d at 294-95; Joiner v. Ryder System Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1478,
1482-88 (C.D. Ill. 1996).
56. See Peetoom, 778 N.E.2d at 294-95.
57. 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 910 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
58. 133 S.W.3d 776 (Tex. App. 2004).
59. Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant Clark USA, Inc. at 21-23, Forsythe v. Clark USA,
Inc., 864 N.E.2d 227 (II1. 2007) (No. 101570).
60. Waste Mgmt., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 912.
1090 [Vol. 58:1083
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gence, alleging that WMI prevented the subsidiary from replacing out-
dated garbage trucks-including the one that killed WMCI's
employee-through its budgetary control over the subsidiary. 61 The
complaint alleged that WMI wanted to reduce its expenses and re-
stricted WMCI's budget so that WMCI could not replace the defective
truck, which led to the employee's death. 62
The Waste Management court began its analysis by noting that a
valid negligence claim required the parent company to have owed a
duty to the subsidiary's employee. 63 The court, however, placed the
burden of providing for the safety of the subsidiary's employees solely
on the subsidiary corporation.64 Consequently, the parent company
owed no duty to employees of the subsidiary to provide a safe work-
ing environment. 65 Additionally, the court viewed the plaintiff's at-
tempts to recover from the parent corporation as an attempt to
circumvent "the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act and the
exclusive remedy provision. ' 66 Similar to the defendant's argument in
Forsythe, the court expressed concern that the plaintiff's argument
would "create presumptive misfeasance by any parent corporation
that approves a subsidiary's budget whenever an employee of the sub-
sidiary is injured due to poorly maintained equipment. '67 The Waste
Management court acknowledged that the plaintiff could have recov-
ered on a direct liability theory, but held that budgetary control was
not sufficient to impose direct liability on the parent corporation. 68
In Coastal Corp., the lawsuit arose from an explosion at a Corpus
Christi, Texas oil refinery. 69 The explosion occurred at an offshore
refinery operated by Coastal Refining & Marketing, Inc. (Coastal Re-
fining), the subsidiary corporation. 70 The defendant parent company,
The Coastal Corporation, owned stock in corporations that owned
stock in Coastal Refining.71 The plaintiffs brought a negligence claim
against the parent company, alleging that the parent controlled "main-
61. Id.
62. Id. at 912-13.
63. Id. at 914.
64. Id. at 914-15 ("WMI's duty was to WMCI as its subsidiary, not to WMCI's employees.").
65. See id.
66. Waste Mgmt., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 916. At the time of the court's decision, the employee's
family was receiving workers' compensation benefits as a result of the accident, and any recovery
in the negligence action would have been in addition to the workers' compensation benefits. See
id. at 912 n.1.
67. Id. at 916; see infra notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
68. Id. at 916-17.
69. 133 S.W.3d 776, 777 (Tex. App. 2004).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 777 n.1.
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tenance, turnaround, and inspection matters at the plant" 72 because it
managed the subsidiary's budget. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged
that Coastal Corporation restricted the subsidiary's access to funds
and refused to fund inspectors and maintenance operations. 73
The parent corporation's budgetary control was relevant to two is-
sues in the case: (1) whether a valid cause of action existed based on a
parent company's negligent control of a subsidiary's budget; and (2)
whether the parent company's budgetary control was affirmative con-
duct, requiring the parent company to exercise reasonable care.74 On
the first issue, the court stated that a parent corporation is liable
"when there is specific control over the activity that caused the acci-
dent. 75 The court did not view budgetary management as specific
control, but rather as "remote conduct" that barred a control-based
negligence claim. 76 On the second issue, the court again noted that
budgetary control is not an affirmative action that can be said to have
caused an accident.77 Similar to Waste Management, the Coastal Corp.
court held that "a parent company's refusal or failure to budget" is
not "affirmative conduct akin to an affirmative undertaking pursued
for the benefit of the injured person. ' 78 Waste Management and
Coastal Corp. show that the Illinois Supreme Court failed to recognize
72. Id. The fire occurred when a pressure vessel at the refinery ruptured as a result of corro-
sion, causing a flammable substance to leak out and explode upon coming into contact with an
ignition source. Id.
73. Id. at 778.
74. See id. at 778-81. The elements of an affirmative conduct claim are characterized as
follows:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another
which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his
things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his
failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the
undertaking.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324(A) (1965); see also Nicole Rosenkrantz, Note, The
Parent Trap: Using the Good Samaritan Doctrine to Hold Parent Corporations Directly Liable
for Their Negligence, 37 B.C. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (1996).
75. Coastal Corp., 133 S.W.3d at 779. Note that the quoted language, without using the exact
words, refers to the theory that the Forsythe court terms direct participant liability. See Forsythe
v. Clark USA, Inc., 864 N.E.2d 227, 237 (Ill. 2007) ("The key elements to the application of
direct participant liability, then, are a parent's specific direction or authorization of the manner in
which an activity is undertaken and foreseeability." (emphasis added)).
76. Coastal Corp., 133 S.W.3d at 779.
77. Id. at 780.
78. Id. at 781; see also Rosenkrantz, supra note 74, at 1061-62.
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that the facts in Forsythe only required the court to hold that budget-
ary control alone is not a basis for direct participant liability.79
III. SUBJECT OPINION: FORSYTHE V. CLARK USA, INc.
This Part provides an overview of the Forsythe decision. Section A
presents the facts of the case and grounds for the plaintiffs' appeal.80
Section B provides a summary of the majority and dissenting opinions
in the intermediate appellate court opinion.8' Finally, Section C
presents the parties' arguments, the majority opinion, and the concur-
ring opinion.82
A. Facts of the Case
In Forsythe, the defendant, Clark USA, was the sole shareholder of
its subsidiary, Clark Refining & Marketing, Inc. (Clark Refining). 83
Clark Refining was in the oil refinery business, and the case arose out
of a tragic incident that occurred at its Blue Island, Illinois facility. 84
In 1995, two maintenance mechanics at the Blue Island facility,
Michael Forsythe and Gary Szabla, were eating lunch.85 In a separate
part of the facility, workers were attempting to replace a pipe valve.8 6
These workers failed to depressurize flammable materials within the
pipe, which caused a swiftly moving fire to break out, killing Forsythe
and Szabla.87
The estates of Forsythe and Szabla received payment under the
Workers' Compensation Act because the employees were killed while
acting within the scope of their employment.8 8 But Forsythe and Sz-
abla's estates also filed a wrongful death suit against Clark Refining
and others, adding Clark USA as a defendant. 89 Clark USA was not
Forsythe and Szabla's employer under the Act, and thus the Act did
not bar the plaintiffs from seeking additional compensation from
Clark USA through a wrongful death claim.90
79. Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 237.
80. See infra notes 83-97 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 98-118 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 119-149 and accompanying text.
83. Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 231; Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 836 N.E.2d 850, 852 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2005), affd, 864 N.E.2d 227 (II. 2007).
84. Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 231.
85. Id. at 230-31.
86. Id. at 231.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 230 (citing 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/1 to 305/18 (2002)).
89. Forsythe's and Szabla's widows brought the suit as administrators of their husbands' es-
tates. Id.
90. Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 240-42.
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The plaintiffs' theory of liability was based on Clark USA's "overall
budgetary strategy."91 This theory rested on the argument that Clark
USA was liable for the deaths of Forsythe and Szabla because it failed
to exercise reasonable care under traditional tort principles. 92 Clark
USA's alleged negligent actions included the use of unqualified, un-
trained employees to replace the pipe valve, which, the plaintiffs ar-
gued, constituted proximate cause.93 According to the plaintiffs, the
employees responsible for replacing the valve "were not maintenance
mechanics and not trained or qualified" to work on that piece of
equipment. 94
In opposing summary judgment, the plaintiffs cited Clark USA's
ambitions to reduce "'capital spending to minimum sustainable levels'
through the institution of a 'survival mode' business plan. ' 95 The bus-
iness plan, plaintiffs argued, "resulted in a series of cutbacks at the
Blue Island refinery that undermined safety, training, and mainte-
nance there and, in turn, created an unreasonable risk of harm to
others including employees of Clark Refining. ' 96 The plaintiffs also
introduced evidence that Clark Refining and Clark USA had inter-
mingled operations in an effort to demonstrate that the parent corpo-
ration was directly responsible for the deaths of Forsythe and Szabla. 97
91. Id. at 231.
92. The court summarized the plaintiffs' theory of the case as follows:
Specifically, plaintiffs allege that defendant breached a duty to use reasonable care in
imposing its business strategy on Clark Refining by (1) "requiring [Clark Refining] to
minimize operating costs including costs for training, maintenance, supervision and
safety," (2) "requiring [Clark Refining] to limit capital investments to those which
would generate cash for the refinery thereby preventing [Clark Refining] from ade-
quately reinforcing the walls of the lunchroom or relocating the lunchroom to a safe
position within the refinery," and (3) "failing to adequately evaluate the safety and
training procedures in place at the Blue Island Refinery." Moreover, plaintiffs allege
that defendant's strategy of capital cutbacks forced Clark Refining to have unqualified
employees act as maintenance mechanics which, in turn, led to the fire that killed the
decedents.
Id.
93. Id.
94. Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 836 N.E.2d 850, 852 (I11. App. Ct. 2005), affd, 864 N.E.2d 227
(Il1. 2007).
95. Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 231.
96. Forsythe, 836 N.E.2d at 853.
97. Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 231 (discussing plaintiffs' evidence that the boards of directors of
Clark Refining and Clark USA held simultaneous meetings and the influence of Paul Melnuk,
CEO of Clark Refining and president of Clark USA).
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B. The Illinois Appellate Court's Opinion
The trial court granted summary judgment without opinion in Clark
USA's favor.98 The plaintiffs appealed to the First District Appellate
Court.99 In a two-to-one opinion, the court reversed the trial court.100
In deciding the negligence issue, the appellate court majority relied
heavily on Esmark and Bestfoods.1°1 The court concluded that direct
participant liability is a valid theory of recovery against a parent cor-
poration in Illinois. 10 2 The court recognized that "[u]nder Illinois law,
a corporation is deemed a distinct legal entity, separate from other
corporations with which it may be affiliated. '10 3 As a result, the cor-
porate veil typically acts to protect parent corporations from their
subsidiaries' liabilities.10 4 But where the theory of liability is "'trans-
action-specific' and thus limited to those instances where [the parent
corporation's] meddling is directly tied to the resultant harmful or tor-
tious conduct of the subsidiary,"' 0 5 the corporate veil's protection is
unavailable. Based on the facts before the court,106 the majority held
that the plaintiffs had put forth enough evidence to warrant a jury trial
on the issue of direct participant liability.10 7
Justice McNulty dissented from the majority opinion and argued
that, as a matter of law, direct participant liability did not apply.108
The dissent focused on a portion of the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion
in Bestfoods, arguing that although the majority cited Bestfoods in
support of direct participant liability, it ignored the applicable portion
of the Court's opinion.10 9 In the dissent's view, the key evidence was
98. Id.
99. Forsythe, 836 N.E.2d 850.
100. Id. at 861. The Illinois Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court dealt not only
with the issue of direct participant liability, but also with the issue of whether the Illinois Work-
ers' Compensation Act shields Clark USA from a common law action. Both courts rejected
Clark USA's attempt to use the Act to its benefit, refusing to allow Clark USA to simultane-
ously claim separation from Clark Refining to avoid liability and claim to be the same entity for
purposes of gaining protection under the Act. Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 240-42; Forsythe, 836
N.E.2d at 858-61.
101. Forsythe, 836 N.E.2d at 854-57.
102. Id. at 854 ("There is, however, a well-established though seldom employed exception to
'the general rule that the corporate veil will not be pierced in the absence of large-scale disre-
gard of the separate existence of a subsidiary corporation'; that exception being 'direct partici-
pant' liability." (citing Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739, 755 (7th Cir. 1989))).
103. Id. (citing Daley v. Am. Drug Stores, Inc., 691 N.E.2d 846 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)).
104. Id. (citing Esmark, 887 F.2d at 753).
105. Id. at 857 (quoting Esmark, 887 F.2d at 756).
106. The First District's recitation of the facts was slightly more detailed than the Illinois Su-
preme Court's summary. See id. at 852-53.
107. Forsythe, 836 N.E.2d at 858.
108. Id. at 861 (McNulty, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
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that Clark USA officers who also served as directors of Clark Refin-
ing knew the effect that budget cuts would have on Clark Refining's
maintenance problems. 110 Focusing on that element as the key to the
plaintiffs' claim, the dissent analyzed the facts under Bestfoods."'
As the dissent described, it is common for directors and officers to
hold positions with the parent and subsidiary and to "change hats," or
act as an officer of the subsidiary in one instance and an officer of the
parent in another.11 2 However, when one person wears two hats,
there is a presumption that "directors are wearing their 'subsidiary
hats' and not their 'parent hats' when acting for the subsidiary. ' 113 In
Bestfoods, the Court held that the plaintiff had the burden of rebut-
ting the presumption that the officers and directors were acting for the
subsidiary when they committed the acts that gave rise to the case. 114
Because the plaintiffs in Forsythe presented "no evidence of separate
acts, attributable solely to defendant," the dissent found that the
plaintiffs failed to rebut the subsidiary hat presumption from
Bestfoods.115 The dissent argued that the evidence gave rise only to
an inference that the directors of Clark Refining were acting in their
capacity as directors of Clark USA in mandating the budget policies
that allegedly caused the fire.116 That inference favored the defen-
dant's argument that it could be liable only through a theory of deriv-
ative liability and only if the plaintiffs were able to pierce the
corporate veil.117 Despite this analysis, Justice McNulty's argument
did not persuade the other members of the panel, and Clark USA
appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court." 8
C. The Illinois Supreme Court's Opinion
Clark USA urged the Illinois Supreme Court to follow the "funda-
mental rule" that required the plaintiffs to pierce the corporate veil to
hold Clark USA liable for what it viewed as the negligence of Clark
110. Id. at 862.
111. Id. at 862-63.
112. Id. at 862 (citing Lusk v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., 129 F.3d 773, 779 (5th Cir. 1997)).
113. Forsythe, 836 N.E.2d at 862 (citing PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS:
PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 1.02.1
(1983)).
114. Id. (citing United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 68-70 (1998)).
115. Id. at 863.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. The other defendants were Universal Oil Products and JBF Associates. Universal Oil
Products settled and JBF Associates won its summary judgment motion at the trial level.
Neither of those parties was part of the appeal from the trial court's ruling. Id. at 852 n.1.
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Refining.119 As Clark USA argued, "A necessary corollary of that
fundamental rule is that a parent company does not owe any duty to
third parties to supervise or control the conduct of its subsidiary to
ensure that the subsidiary acts with reasonable care. ' 120 Clark USA
further claimed that it owed no duty to the employees of Clark Refin-
ing and therefore faced no liability for setting "financial goals for its
subsidiary" and adopting "an 'overall strategy' as to how those goals
should be achieved.' 21 Clark USA also argued that from a public
policy perspective, to impose "the Appellate Court's novel implication
of a duty of care to the employees of a subsidiary to supervise the
subsidiary's implementation of strategic business decisions ... would
eviscerate the concept of limited liability on which investors in Illinois
and throughout the Nation have historically relied.' 22
The court began its analysis with a brief discussion of fundamental
principles of tort law.123 A defendant in Illinois is liable for negli-
gence where it owed the plaintiff a duty of care, breached that duty,
and proximately caused the plaintiff's injury.'2 4 The plaintiffs' direct
participant theory allowed them to prove that Clark USA owed a duty
to maintain safe working conditions at Clark Refining. 125
Initially, the court noted that as a theory of liability, direct partici-
pant liability was new territory for Illinois courts.126 Unlike the appel-
late court, which primarily sought guidance from Esmark, the Illinois
Supreme Court relied heavily on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Bestfoods and the Court's references to the article by Justice Douglas
119. Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant Clark USA, Inc. at 13, Forsythe v. Clark USA,
Inc., 864 N.E.2d 227 (Il1. 2007) (No. 101570). The plaintiffs continued to argue the validity of the
theory of direct participant liability before the Illinois Supreme Court:
The essence of Plaintiffs' Complaints is that Clark USA, despite having knowledge that
its overall business strategy in reducing training and maintenance was adversely affect-
ing safety at [Clark Refining], demanded [Clark Refining] to operate the refinery pur-
suant to Clark USA's overall business strategy. Actions taken by Clark USA in the
form of its 1995 Economic Imperatives directly created the unsafe conditions in which
the fire occurred. The connection between the two fatalities and Clark USA's interfer-
ence was so intimate as to make the resulting liability to Clark USA direct and not
vicarious.
Brief and Argument of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 7, Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d 227 (No. 101570).
120. Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant Clark USA, Inc., supra note 119, at 13.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 14.
123. Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 232.
124. Id. (citing Espinoza v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry., 649 N.E.2d 1323 (Ill. 1995)).
125. Id. ("As we have recently stated, the 'touchstone of this court's duty analysis is to ask
whether a plaintiff and a defendant stood in such a relationship to one another that the law
imposed upon the defendant an obligation of reasonable conduct for the benefit of the plain-
tiff.'" (internal citation omitted)).
126. Id.
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and Carrol Shanks in that opinion. 127 The Illinois Supreme Court
quoted Bestfoods to distinguish normal parent direction of a subsidi-
ary from direction that exposes it to liability:
"the acts of direct operation that give rise to parental liability must
necessarily be distinguished from the interference that stems from
the normal relationship between parent and subsidiary," and "[t]he
critical question is whether, in degree and detail, actions directed to
the facility by an agent of the parent alone are eccentric under ac-
cepted norms of parental oversight of a subsidiary's facility. '128
The court also cited a host of cases that approved direct participant
liability to illustrate the theory's wide acceptance. 129
The evidence in Forsythe showed that the plaintiff's negligence the-
ory relied heavily on Clark USA's alleged manipulation of Clark Re-
fining's budget. 130  This budget-backed theory forced the court to
address Waste Management and Coastal Corp., which supported Clark
USA's position.1 3 1  The court distinguished Waste Management and
Coastal Corp. on the ground that those cases stand for the idea that a
"direct participant theory cannot rest solely upon budgetary misman-
agement, but budgetary mismanagement can make up one part of a
viable claim. ' 132
Having recognized direct participant liability as a valid theory, the
court stated the rule for direct participant liability in Illinois:
Where there is evidence sufficient to prove that a parent company
mandated an overall business and budgetary strategy and carried
that strategy out by its own specific direction or authorization, sur-
passing the control exercised as a normal incident of ownership in
disregard for the interests of the subsidiary, that parent company
could face liability. The key elements to the application of direct
participant liability, then, are a parent's specific direction or author-
127. Id. at 233-34. The court referenced Esmark to describe, in abstract terms, when direct
participant liability is appropriate. See id. at 234. In Bestfoods the Court consistently refers to
Justice Douglas as the author. Justice Douglas authored the first two parts, which are the por-
tions to which the Court cited, and Shanks authored the third part, which the Court did not
reference. 524 U.S. 51, 64 n.ll (1998).
128. Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 234 (quoting Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 71-72). Bestfoods, like For-
sythe, deals with a parent corporation's liability for actions taken at a facility operated by a
subsidiary. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 57-58.
129. See Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 234-36.
130. Id. at 231.
131. Id. at 236-37 (citing Coastal Corp. v. Torres, 133 S.W.3d 776 (Tex. App. 2004); Waste
Mgmt. Inc. v. Super. Ct., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 910 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)).
132. Id. at 237. It is clear that budgetary mismanagement, with nothing else, is insufficient to
implicate direct participant liability in Illinois. Id. With this in mind, it appears that the Forsythe
plaintiffs might have a problem winning at trial on the facts present in this case.
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ization of the manner in which an activity is undertaken and
foreseeability.133
Through this rule, the court sought to tie direct participant liability
back to its original premise that a duty must exist before a court will
impose liability under traditional tort principles. 134
The court stated that, in Illinois, courts use "four policy-based fac-
tors... to determine whether a duty exists": "(1) the reasonable fore-
seeability of injury, (2) the likelihood of injury, (3) the magnitude of
the burden of guarding against the injury, and (4) the consequences of
placing the burden upon the defendant.' 35 First, the court held that
the injury was foreseeable because of the possibility that "severe cut-
backs in staffing, safety, maintenance, and training ... could lead...
to the injury of others."'1 36 Second, based on the nature of the cut-
backs, the court held that there was a likelihood of injury.137 Third,
the court reasoned that placing the burden on a parent company to
prevent foreseeable injuries does not prevent them from prescribing
"overall business and budgetary strategies" as long as they do not in-
terfere in such a way "that the subsidiaries are no longer free to utilize
their own expertise. ' 138 Fourth, the court held that because parent
corporations have a limited role with their subsidiaries, exercising due
care was not an undue burden. 39
In the final step of its analysis, the court applied direct participant
liability to the facts and found that genuine issues of fact existed to
preclude summary judgment for the defendant. 140 In denying sum-
mary judgment for Clark USA, the court looked closely at the role of
Paul Melnuk, as CEO of Clark Refining and as president of Clark
USA.141 Based on company memoranda and business agendas, the
court concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
which "hat" Melnuk wore when he directed the budget cuts at Clark
Refining.1 42 The court held that it was unclear whether Melnuk, act-
ing for Clark USA, directed the budget cuts with the knowledge that
133. Id.
134. Id. at 232.
135. Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 237-38 (citing Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048
(I1. 2006)).
136. Id. at 238.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 238-40.
141. Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 238-39.
142. Id. at 240. The dissent from the intermediate appellate court discussed the hat issue at
length in arguing that the court erred in ruling for the plaintiffs. Id. at 231; Forsythe v. Clark
USA, Inc., 836 N.E.2d 850, 852 (I1. App. Ct. 2005), affd, 864 N.E.2d 227 (I1. 2007).
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the cuts would adversely affect employee safety at Clark Refining. 143
If Melnuk directed the budget cuts knowing that it would reduce em-
ployee safety to the detriment of Clark Refining and to the benefit of
Clark USA, the plaintiffs could prevail on their negligence claim using
a direct participant liability theory. 44 In light of the ambiguity sur-
rounding Melnuk's role and the summary judgment standard favoring
the non-movant, the court affirmed the denial of summary
judgment.1 45
In his concurring opinion, Justice Freeman explained the limits of
the direct participant exception to "the bedrock principle of limited
liability for corporate shareholders.' 146 The concurrence attempted to
quell fears that Illinois courts would use the Forsythe opinion as a li-
cense to hold parent corporations liable for acts that are common-
place in a parent-subsidiary relationship. 147 Despite the fact that
"rarely will a parent company ... step outside the proper role of a
parent ... [such] that it can be viewed as directly inflicting harm on
the subsidiary's employees or third parties doing business with the
subsidiary," the concurring justices agreed that the plaintiffs put forth
sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. 148 In an effort to
further elucidate the narrow exception to limited liability, the concur-
rence noted that summary judgment review required the court to
make all inferences favorable to the plaintiff and that "[t]he decision
today should not be interpreted as indicating or telegraphing whether
plaintiffs will ultimately succeed on the merits of this cause of
action." 149
IV. ANALYSIS
This Part identifies two related aspects of the court's opinion that
could lead to confusion and incorrect judgments in future cases. Sec-
143. Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 240.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 244.
147. The concurrence provides this edification:
Throughout these proceedings, defendant has voiced the valid concern that the direct
participation liability theory of recovery must not be stretched to such an extent that it
encompasses routine and proper exercises of shareholder control, lest the exception
swallows the general rule and serves to spawn a flood of lawsuits against parent compa-
nies. I agree with defendant on this point, and our opinion today preserves the proper
balance between the general rule and this narrow exception.
Id. at 244-45 (Freeman, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 245-48. The concurring opinion discusses a number of facts not included in the
majority opinion and discusses some facts with greater specificity. Id.
149. Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 249.
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tion A argues that the facts in Forsythe did not require the court to
recognize direct participant liability theory.150  Instead, the court
should have followed the lead of Waste Management and Coastal
Corp. and held that budgetary control is not a basis for imposing di-
rect liability on a parent corporation. 151 Section B addresses the in-
consistencies between the court's rule and the outcome of the case,
which will likely cause confusion in the area of corporate liability.152
The court's concept of direct participant liability and the concept of
piercing the corporate veil apply to similar fact patterns, though one is
called a direct theory of liability and the other a vicarious theory of
liability.153 The concurrence's assurance that the exception (direct lia-
bility) will not swallow the general rule (piercing the corporate veil) is
not persuasive. 154 Forsythe diminishes the difference between direct
liability and vicarious liability, which creates confusion and uncer-
tainty for parent corporations attempting to limit their tort liability
exposure. 155
A. Budgetary Control
Despite the court's insistence otherwise, a thoughtful look at the
facts in Forsythe reveals that the plaintiffs' theory of liability was
based on Clark USA's budgetary control over Clark Refining.156 The
court focused on the role of Paul Melnuk, president of Clark USA and
150. See infra notes 156-168 and accompanying text.
151. Waste Mgmt. Inc. v. Super. Ct., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 910, 915 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) ("Negli-
gently controlling or intentionally mismanaging a subsidiary's budget does not create a duty on
the part of the parent corporation to ensure safety or prevent injuries to the subsidiary's employ-
ees."); Coastal Corp. v. Torres, 133 S.W.3d 776, 779 (Tex. App. 2004) ("Because appellees have
provided us with no authority, and we find none, where a Texas court has imposed liability
against a parent company, under mainstream principles of tort law, for negligent control of such
remote conduct as budgeting activities, we conclude appellees' control-based negligence theory
of recovery fails.").
152. See infra notes 169-209 and accompanying text.
153. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion
Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L. REv. 853, 871 (1997) ("Still,
the end result should be the same whether one labels the defendant's liability as the result of
piercing or as direct liability for the defendant's own tort or contract.").
154. Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 244-45 (Freeman, J., concurring) ("[O]ur opinion today pre-
serves the proper balance between the general rule and this narrow exception.").
155. Numerous commentators have recognized the uncertainty in corporate liability law and
veil piercing jurisprudence. See Gevurtz, supra note 153, at 853 (citing Robert B. Thompson,
Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991), for the pro-
position that not only is piercing the corporate veil a confusing area of corporate law, but it is
also the most litigated).
156. Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 238 ("[W]e must resolve whether there exists a question of mate-
rial fact such that ... defendant's overall business and budgetary strategy involved the negligent
direction or authorization of the manner in which Clark Refining conducted its business.").
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CEO of Clark Refining, in finding that a genuine issue of fact existed
as to whether Clark USA was a direct participant in causing the fire
that killed Forsythe and Szabla. 157 The court cited Melnuk's "1995
Economic Imperatives" memorandum, which included statements
about operating the business in "survival mode" and reducing spend-
ing and expenses to "minimum sustainable levels."'158 As further sup-
port, the court noted that Melnuk knew that any cost-cutting would
come from areas that were related to the accident, such as "education,
training, repairs, and equipment maintenance.' 159 Ultimately, the
court framed the key issue as whether Melnuk acted negligently in
controlling "the manner in which the budget cuts [in this case] were
taken. ' 160 It is difficult to reconcile these facts with the court's claim
that "a viable claim of liability under the direct participant theory can-
not rest solely upon budgetary mismanagement. "161
The Illinois Supreme Court's admonition that direct participant lia-
bility cannot rest on budgetary control alone directly contradicts its
denial of summary judgment in Forsythe.162 In an effort to make its
decision appear consistent with Waste Management and Coastal Corp.,
the Forsythe court focused on the language in those decisions indicat-
ing that direct participant liability is a valid theory of liability. 163 The
Illinois court then stretched the meaning of Waste Management and
Coastal Corp., asserting that those cases stand for the proposition that
a direct participant liability claim cannot rely "solely upon budgetary
mismanagement, but budgetary mismanagement can make up one
part of a viable claim, in conjunction with the direction or authoriza-
tion of the manner in which an activity is undertaken.' 64 Waste Man-
agement and Coastal Corp. do little to elucidate what would constitute
a successful direct participant claim. Instead, the courts in those cases
adopted the narrower holding that excludes budgetary mismanage-
ment as a basis for parental liability. 65
Even accepting the Forsythe court's broad readings of Waste Man-
agement and Coastal Corp., it is difficult to reconcile those interpreta-
157. Id. at 238-40.
158. Id. at 239. The plaintiffs pointed to the fact that Melnuk composed the memorandum on
Clark USA letterhead as evidence of direct participation. Id.
159. Id. at 240.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 237.
162. See supra notes 156-161 and accompanying text.
163. Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 237.
164. Id. ("[W]e conclude that budgetary mismanagement, accompanied by the parent's negli-
gent direction or authorization of the manner in which the subsidiary accomplishes that budget,
can lead to a valid cause of action under the direct participant theory of liability.").
165. See supra notes 57-79 and accompanying text.
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tions with the denial of summary judgment on the facts of Forsythe.1 66
The court stated that control beyond budgetary mismanagement must
exist to establish negligence on the part of a parent corporation under
a direct participant liability theory. 167 But, unlike the Waste Manage-
ment and Coastal Corp. courts, the Illinois court failed to follow its
own rule, allowing the plaintiffs to survive summary judgment by ar-
guing only budgetary mismanagement. 168
B. Confusion in the Area of Corporate Liability
This Section first briefly examines the complexities of corporate lia-
bility law.' 69 Next, this Section discusses the concept of direct partici-
pant liability in Forsythe and reveals that the Illinois court did not
meaningfully distinguish it from the Illinois law on piercing the corpo-
rate veil.170 Although the distinction between direct and vicarious lia-
bility is not critical to the outcome of every case, this Section argues
that Forsythe renders any distinction meaningless under Illinois law,
adding to the existing confusion in corporate liability law.171 The final
portion of this Section argues that to alleviate confusion and preserve
subsidiary employees' ability to recover from parent corporations, Illi-
nois courts should force plaintiffs to pierce the corporate veil, but re-
lax standards for piercing the corporate veil where a parent
corporation is the defendant. 172
166. See supra notes 83-97 and accompanying text. Clark USA urged the court to follow the
Waste Management and Coastal Corp. decisions in deciding Forsythe. Opening Brief of Defen-
dant-Appellant Clark USA, Inc., supra note 119, at 22 ("The same analysis should apply here.
Plaintiffs' claim is not that Clark USA negligently operated the refinery; rather, it is that it
negligently set financial goals that caused [Clark Refining] to negligently manage the refinery.").
167. The plaintiffs' claim rested largely on Clark USA's budgetary control:
The essence of Plaintiffs' Complaints is that Clark USA, despite having knowledge
that its overall business strategy in reducing training and maintenance was adversely
affecting safety at [Clark Refining], demanded [Clark Refining] to operate the refinery
pursuant to Clark USA's overall business strategy. Actions taken by Clark USA in the
form of its 1995 Economic Imperatives directly created the unsafe conditions in which
the fire occurred.
Brief and Argument of Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 119, at 7.
168. See id.
169. See infra notes 173-180 and accompanying text.
170. See infra notes 181-197 and accompanying text.
171. See infra notes 181-197 and accompanying text.
172. See infra notes 198-209 and accompanying text.
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1. A Study in Uncertainty: Corporate Liability
The Forsythe court added a layer of complexity to an already com-
plex area of the law.173 Corporate liability, particularly the liability of
a parent corporation for the wrongs of its subsidiary, is a dense and
frequently litigated field. 174 Much of the complexity in the area of
corporate liability begins with the amorphous concept of "piercing the
corporate veil."'1 75 Generally, courts will pierce the corporate veil and
hold a parent corporation liable for the conduct of its subsidiary when
equity demands it.176 Not surprisingly, courts have exercised this eq-
uitable power in a variety of situations, creating a body of inconsistent
case law. 177
More important for present purposes, varying terminologies drive
veil piercing law, which has led to a number of theories that differ in
name but serve the same purpose: ignoring the traditional rule of lim-
ited liability when equity demands it.178 Although direct participant
173. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 78;
Blumberg, supra note 38, at 328 (lamenting the "much criticized, irreconcilable, and unpredict-
able nature" of veil piercing decisions); Blumberg, supra note 31, at 307; Gevurtz, supra note
153, at 853; Jennifer S. Martin, Consistency in Judicial Interpretation? A Look at CERCLA Par-
ent Company and Shareholder Liability After United States v. Bestfoods, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
409, 415 (2000); Presser, supra note 34, at 154; Schipani, supra note 15, at 692.
174. Thompson, supra note 39, at 383 (stating that veil piercing "is the most litigated issue in
corporate law" (citing Thompson, supra note 155, at 1036 n.1)).
175. See supra notes 173-174 and accompanying text. Professor Blumberg has argued for an
overhaul of the entire system of corporate liability to deal with economic realities:
It is no longer realistic to adhere to the traditional view that for legal purposes each
of the constituent corporations in a corporate group is a separate legal entity with rights
and duties unaffected by its functioning as an integral component of a group collec-
tively conducting a common business under common control. It is time for the bench,
bar, and academy to consider the circumstances under which the parent and affiliated
companies of the group should also be liable for the duties and obligations of other
group constituents.
Blumberg, supra note 31, at 287-88.
176. See Bainbridge, supra note 173, at 77-78 ("The standard justification for veil piercing
argues that it serves as a safety valve allowing courts to address cases in which the externalities
associated with limited liability seem excessive." (citing WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON
EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 191 (7th ed. unabr. 1995))).
177. Id. at 78 n.4 (for the proposition that veil piercing "seems to happen freakishly. Like
lightning, it is rare, severe, and unprincipled." (citing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89 (1985))); Gevurtz, supra note
153, at 853 ("[D]espite hundreds of opportunities to get it right, judicial opinions in this area
have made it one of the most befuddled."); Thompson, supra note 39, at 387 (displaying the
results of a study of the factors that courts consider in veil piercing cases).
178. Blumberg, supra note 31, at 307 (Veil piercing has become "almost inscrutable ... behind
conclusory metaphors such as 'mere instrumentality,' 'sham,' 'adjunct,' 'agent,' 'alter ego,' 'pup-
pet,' or dozens of similarly murky terms"); see also Berky v. Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61
(N.Y. 1926) (Justice Cardozo's famous caution that "[m]etaphors in law are to be narrowly
watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it").
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liability is generally considered conceptually different from veil pierc-
ing in that veil piercing is a form of vicarious liability, there are cases
in which the distinction between direct and indirect actions is less than
clear.179 The similarity between direct participant liability and veil
piercing in Illinois becomes apparent after examining the rules for
each theory of liability.180
2. A Tenuous Distinction Between Theories Under Illinois Law
Direct participant liability is present "[w]here there is evidence suf-
ficient to prove that a parent company mandated an overall business
and budgetary strategy and carried that strategy out by its own spe-
cific direction or authorization, surpassing the control exercised as a
normal incident of ownership in disregard for the interests of the sub-
sidiary." 181 In comparison, Illinois courts will pierce the corporate veil
when (1) there exists "such unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personalities of the [subsidiary] corporation and the [parent
corporation] no longer exist," and (2) "the circumstances . . . exist
such that adherence to the fiction of a separate corporate existence
would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or promote inequitable
consequences. '1 82 In other words, courts will pierce the corporate veil
when the parent corporation directs a subsidiary's actions to such a
degree that it is unjust to allow the parent corporation to escape
liability. 183
The first factor for piercing the corporate veil-lack of separate
personalities of the subsidiary and parent corporations-closely re-
sembles the rule for direct participant liability from Forsythe.184 The
second veil piercing factor-the fiction of separate entities is a fraud,
179. Professor Guvertz argues that differentiating between direct and vicarious corporate lia-
bility is not always a significant step in determining the outcome of a case:
Technically, these cases do not involve piercing at all, at least if by piercing one
means holding the shareholder liable for the debt of the corporation. The reason is that
in each of these cases, the plaintiff has a tort or contract cause of action against the
shareholder.... If the shareholder committed the tort damaging the plaintiff... then
the shareholder is liable for his or her own tort.... [T]he end result should be the same
whether one labels the defendant's liability as the result of piercing or as direct liability
for the defendant's own tort or contract .... Accordingly, one cannot complain too
much if the court wants to label this piercing ....
Guvertz, supra note 153, at 870-71.
180. Compare Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 864 N.E.2d 227, 237 (I11. 2007) (announcing the
rule for direct participant liability), with Fontana v. TLD Builders, Inc., 840 N.E.2d 767, 775-76
(Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (stating clearly the Illinois rule for veil piercing).
181. Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 237.
182. 13 ILL. LAW & PRACrICE Corporations § 9, at 235 (2000).
183. See id.
184. See Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 237.
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injustice, or promotes inequitable consequences-incorporates the
concept inherent in tort law of remedying the consequences of an un-
justifiable action. 185 These similarities in language and purpose
demonstrate that in Illinois direct participant liability and the doctrine
of piercing the corporate veil both apply where the separation be-
tween the parent and subsidiary corporations has sufficiently broken
down so that allowing the parent corporation to escape liability is un-
justifiable. 186 Consequently, a veil piercing analysis and a direct par-
ticipant liability analysis under Forsythe would likely reach the same
result for the same reasons.
The Forsythe court did not completely ignore Clark USA's argu-
ment that the plaintiffs had to pierce the corporate veil to hold it lia-
ble for Forsythe and Szabla's deaths, but the court reviewed the
argument summarily. 187 As an initial matter, the Illinois Supreme
Court agreed with the Bestfoods Court's recognition of the difference
between direct and vicarious liability.188 Later in the opinion, the
court clarified that "[d]irect participant liability, as we now recognize
it, does not rest on piercing the corporate veil such that the liability of
the subsidiary is the liability of the parent. 1 89 Rather, direct partici-
pant liability turns on the manner in which most courts conceptualize
the difference between the direct and indirect actions of parent corpo-
rations.1 90 As previously noted, the Forsythe concurrence shows con-
cern for the potential of the court's decision to dilute or confuse the
theory of limited corporate liability, but argues that the majority deci-
185. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 6 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds.,
5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON] ("The common thread woven into all torts is
the idea of unreasonable interference with the interests of others .... The tort-feasor usually is
held liable for acting with an intention that the law treats as unjustified .... " (emphasis added)).
186. See generally Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d 227.
187. See id. at 233. Clark USA addressed veil piercing only briefly, focusing its efforts on
rebutting the intermediate appellate court's finding that Clark USA owed a duty to the plaintiffs.
Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant Clark USA, Inc., supra note 119, at 13 ("It is hornbook
law that, unless the stringent standards for piercing the corporate veil are met, a parent company
is not liable for the negligence of its subsidiary.").
188. Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 233-34 (citing United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 64-65
(1998)) (looking to the Douglas and Shanks article, supra note 6, for the proposition that courts
have viewed vicarious, or derivative liability, cases differently than those where the parent cor-
poration's actions directly caused the harm).
189. Id. at 241.
190. See Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v. RLG, Inc., 755 N.E.2d 556, 563 (Ind. 2001) ("Unlike the
responsible corporate office doctrine, or specific statutory liability, veil piercing is not dependent
on the nature of the liability. In contrast ... liability here is essentially based on his individual
participation in the violations."); Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'l Pension Fund v. Elite
Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d 1031, 1038 (7th Cir. 2000) ("But a contention that A is B's 'alter ego'
asserts that A and B are the same entity; liability then is not vicarious but direct."); Douglas &
Shanks, supra note 6, at 208.
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sion outlines only a minor exception to limited liability.191 The con-
currence's effort to assuage fears that the court was broadening
corporate liability begs the question of why the Forsythe court did not
force the plaintiffs to pierce the corporate veil instead of allowing
them to move forward on a theory of direct participant liability.192
The simple answer is that many courts, including the U.S. Supreme
Court, have recognized direct participant liability, and the Illinois
court in Forsythe saw no reason to prevent the plaintiffs from pursuing
its claim under a generally accepted theory. 193 But consistency and
efficiency in judicial decision making counsel toward taking a second
look at the Illinois rule for direct participant liability. A potential for
overlap exists between direct participant liability and piercing the cor-
porate veil.194 Despite the similarities between the doctrines, the Illi-
nois Supreme Court failed to construct its direct participant liability
rule carefully enough to avoid confusion, as shown in the concurring
justices' attempt to fortify the majority opinion.195 Admittedly, in
suits involving parent corporations, as opposed to those involving a
corporate officer, the direct-vicarious distinction is not always criti-
cal.1 96 But, as in Forsythe, where the distinction is important because
the plaintiff's claim rests on budgetary control, a parent corporation
has no protection under Illinois law if a plaintiff simply argues a direct
participant theory of liability.197
3. Addressing the Confusion: Recognizing That Parent
Corporations Are Different
It makes little sense for the Illinois Supreme Court to recognize two
separate theories of liability that accomplish the same end.198 Unfair-
ness to corporate defendants is a common argument against direct
191. See Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 244-45 (Freeman, J., concurring).
192. See id. at 233 (majority opinion) ("Defendant contends that unless the standards for
piercing the corporate veil are met, a parent company cannot be held liable for the negligence of
its subsidiary.").
193. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
194. See Gevurtz, supra note 153, at 870-71.
195. Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 244 (Freeman, J., concurring) ("I underscore that our opinion
today does not alter the bedrock principle of limited liability for corporate shareholders, and
that direct participant liability is a very narrow exception to this general principle.").
196. See Gevurtz, supra note 153, at 871; Thompson, supra note 39, at 385 (tracking direct
liability cases as part of a statistical study on veil piercing and noting that direct participant
liability occurred "in less than five percent of the cases studied").
197. See generally Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d 227.
198. Compare Thompson, supra note 39, at 395-96 (arguing that in veil piercing cases, courts
should put "greater attention on the second part of the test which concerns the wrong committed
by the corporation"), with PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 185, §1, at 6 (stating that the goal
of tort law is to assess liability for unjustifiable actions).
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participant liability. But a parent corporation that adheres to the cor-
porate formalities that allow it to avoid veil piercing liability should
also avoid direct participant liability. 199 Justice Douglas and Shanks
provide a stronger argument against Illinois's concept of direct partici-
pant liability: abundant confusion exists in the area of corporate lia-
bility, making it difficult to predict the outcome of any particular
case.200 To resolve this issue, some commentators have argued that
courts should make veil piercing easier for plaintiffs where parent and
subsidiary corporations share the blame in creating the conditions that
led to a tort claim.201 This approach makes sense when viewed in the
context of the origin of veil piercing law.20 2 The corporate veil is
meant to encourage investment by making it difficult to hold individu-
als personally liable for the liabilities of the organization.203 Parent
corporations receive protection under veil piercing law as a byproduct
of their status as shareholders.20 4 But parent corporations are not the
same as individual shareholders, and treating them as individual
shareholders is a controversial fiction of corporate law. 205
Judicial recognition of the difference between parent corporations
and individual shareholders would allow courts to accurately assess
liability. Often the facts show that because of budgetary control, dual
199. See Gevurtz, supra note 153, at 869-71.
200. Douglas & Shanks, supra note 6, at 195 (citing Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61
(N.Y. 1926)); see also supra notes 173-197 and accompanying text.
201. See Thompson, supra note 39, at 384 n.31 ("[A] parent-subsidiary relationship will be
more closely scrutinized and may be more readily susceptible to veil-piercing than corporations
with individual shareholders." (citing Cathy S. Krendl & James R. Krendl, Piercing the Corpo-
rate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry, 55 DENV. L.J. 1, 43 (1978))).
202. Presser, supra note 34, at 155-56.
203. Id. Professor Presser goes further, arguing that limited liability was a motivational force
behind shaping American democracy and urbanization. Id. at 156 (citing RONALD E. SEAVOY,
THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION, 1784-1855, at 70 (1982)).
204. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
205. Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel argue that treating parent corporations differ-
ently than individuals when it comes to tort claims is economically and socially logical:
Courts' greater willingness to allow creditors to reach the assets of corporate as op-
posed to personal shareholders is ... consistent with economic principles.
Allowing creditors to reach the assets of parent corporations does not create unlim-
ited liability for any investor. . . . Moreover, the moral-hazard problem is probably
greater in parent-subsidiary situations because subsidiaries have less incentive to in-
sure .... If limited liability is absolute, a parent can form a subsidiary with minimal
capitalization for the purpose of engaging in risky activities .... This asymmetry be-
tween the benefits and costs, if limited liability were absolute, would create incentives
to engage in a socially excessive amount of risky activities.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 37, at 56-57; Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified Approach
To Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 589, 596-97
(1975) (stating that creditors that deal with multiple corporations face greater exposure because
there exists a lesser emphasis on capitalization, a greater danger for the commingling of assets,
and a greater potential for a subsidiary to fail to develop individual profit-making capabilities).
1108
FORSYTHE V. CLARK USA, INC.
officers, directives to subsidiaries, or any other means of control, a
parent company bears some responsibility for the torts of its subsidi-
ary. Instead of validating the plaintiffs' direct participant liability the-
ory, the Illinois Supreme Court should have considered the
defendant's status as a parent corporation and conducted a veil pierc-
ing analysis to decide Forsythe.206 As a result, lower courts would fo-
cus less on the tenuous difference between direct and vicarious forms
of liability that resulted from Forsythe. Instead, they would focus on
whether the parent corporation's actions, which often include exercis-
ing considerable control over the subsidiary, were such that allowing it
to escape liability would "promote inequitable consequences. ' 20 7 This
approach balances the interests of protecting individual shareholders
and assigning liability to the parties that bear responsibility for the
harm.208 Simultaneously, it prevents further confusion and avoids fur-
ther crowding the lexicon of corporate liability law.20 9
V. IMPACT
At a minimum, the court should have addressed the impact that its
decision would have on corporate liability in Illinois and expanded its
discussion of the relationship between veil piercing and direct partici-
pant liability.21 0 This Part addresses the impact of the court's failure
to consider Forsythe's place in the broader scheme of corporate liabil-
ity.211 Section A examines the meaning of the court's direct partici-
pant liability rule in application and the effect that the Forsythe
decision will have on both defendants and plaintiffs in future cases.212
Section B discusses the potential for the decision to further confuse
corporate liability law.2 13
206. See Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 864 N.E.2d 227, 231 (Ill. 2007).
207. 13 ILL. LAW & PRACTICE Corporations § 9 (2000).
208. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 37, at 56-57; Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking
Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enter-
prise, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1, 40 (1994) ("Even if piercing would be harsh to a passive parent
corporation that did not participate in the wrongful action, it would seem to be outweighed by
the harshness to those injured.").
209. Commentators have recognized this problem:
[M]any writers have criticized the courts' tendency in this area to reason by pejorative.
For example, courts often explain their decision to pierce by announcing that the cor-
poration was a mere "sham" or "shell," or the defendant's "alter ego" or "instrumen-
tality." At best, such terms are unhelpful. All too often, they confuse the issue.
Gevurtz, supra note 153, at 855.
210. See Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 241.
211. See infra notes 214-232 and accompanying text.
212. See infra notes 214-224 and accompanying text.
213. See infra notes 225-232 and accompanying text.
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A. Impact of the Forsythe Rule
The Illinois Supreme Court held that direct participant liability
arises when a parent company directed a budgetary strategy, the strat-
egy was carried out under the parent company's direction, and such
direction surpassed the normal control that a parent company is enti-
tled to exert over a subsidiary.21 4 Although the rule includes budget-
ary strategy, the court pointedly stated that budgetary
mismanagement alone was not sufficient to hold a parent corporation
liable for negligence under a direct participant theory.215 Accord-
ingly, parent companies that exercise acceptable control over their
subsidiaries should be able to avoid liability for the actions of their
subsidiaries. 216 In practice, however, courts applying Forsythe will
have to confront the contradiction between the prohibition against
basing a direct participant liability claim solely on budgetary control
and the court's decision to allow the plaintiffs to proceed when budg-
etary control was the basis for their claim.217
In one of the first decisions to apply Forsythe, Sargent v. Cassens
Corp., a federal district court focused on an additional aspect of the
Forsythe rule in rejecting the plaintiffs' direct participant liability the-
ory.218 In Sargent, the court held that the plaintiffs had no claim
under Forsythe because the parent corporation's actions were not con-
trary to the interests of the subsidiary. 219 The court distinguished For-
sythe by focusing on the harm Clark USA caused to its subsidiary in
creating conditions that led to the deadly fire.220 In contrast, the par-
ent corporation in Sargent did not act to the detriment of its subsidiary
and actually attempted to reduce on-the-job injuries. 221 Sargent indi-
214. Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 237.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 242 ("Budgetary oversight alone is insufficient, as is a parent company's commis-
sion of acts consistent with its investor status.").
217. See supra notes 146-149 and accompanying text. The court emphasized that it was oper-
ating under a summary judgment standard of review, Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 232, but that logic
fails to justify denying summary judgment when a claim is based on budgetary mismanagement
after factoring in the costs of taking litigation past the point of summary judgment.
218. No. 06-cv-1042-MJR, 2007 WL 1673289 (S.D. Il. June 7, 2007).
219. Id. at *7.
220. Id.
221. The Sargent court held that the plaintiff had clearly not met a required element of
Forsythe:
Unlike Forsythe, Plaintiffs here acknowledge that the Loss Control Program was
"aimed at reducing personal injuries resulting from on-the-job accidents" and fail to
show how the Program was advantageous to Cassens Corporation and contrary to the
interests of Cassens Transport. Thus, Plaintiffs fail to meet a necessary element of di-
rect-participant liability.
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cates that in addition to the stated requirement that plaintiffs allege
more than budgetary mismanagement, Forsythe contains an additional
barrier for plaintiffs2 22: plaintiffs alleging direct participant liability
must prove that the parent corporation not only directly caused the
accident but also harmed the subsidiary with its negligent actions.223
Forsythe was ostensibly a victory for tort plaintiffs seeking to recover
from parent corporations in addition to the subsidiary's payments
under the Workers' Compensation Act (or as a substitution for these
payments in the case of an insolvent subsidiary); however, Sargent
shows that in practice it will be difficult to prevail on a direct partici-
pant liability claim. 224
B. Compounded Confusion for Corporate Liability
A second impact of the Forsythe decision is that it adds another
wrinkle to corporate liability in Illinois. 225 Part IV detailed some of
the inconsistencies prevalent in the law of corporate liability.226 Par-
ent corporations involved in tort litigation are the parties most likely
to confront the effects of this type of confusion.227 Uncertainty makes
it difficult for corporations to accurately assess their liability exposure,
thus possibly deterring investment. 228 Because the invention of lim-
ited corporate liability was motivated by a desire to protect sharehold-
ers and encourage investment, increased uncertainty in corporate
liability law will likely discourage parent corporations from investing
222. See Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 864 N.E.2d 227, 237 (Ill. 2007).
223. It is plausible that by directly causing an injury to an employee of the subsidiary, the
parent company harmed the subsidiary corporation, especially considering the automatic com-
pensation under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act, thus establishing the element that was
missing in Sargent.
224. The Forsythe court made clear that the plaintiff had not won the case by prevailing on the
summary judgment motion:
Drawing no ultimate conclusions on the merits of plaintiffs' case and mindful that sum-
mary judgment is an extraordinary remedy, summary judgment was inappropriate in
this matter. We recognize the direct participant theory of liability. We note, however,
that this theory of liability gives rise to a duty only in limited circumstances.
Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 242; see also Helen Gunnarsson, Parent Companies More Vulnerable to
Suit for Subsidiaries' Torts, 95 ILL. B.J. 172, 171 (2007) (noting that the court's "cautionary lan-
guage" regarding a parent corporation's budgetary oversight presents an obstacle to the Forsythe
plaintiffs' ability to prevail on the merits).
225. See generally Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d 227.
226. See supra notes 173-209 and accompanying text.
227. See Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 244-45 (Freeman, J., concurring) (dismissing Clark USA's
argument that the court's decision will cause a rush of litigation against parent corporations).
228. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 37, at 43-44 (arguing that unlimited liability would
prevent investment in risky ventures that have a positive net value, depriving society of the
benefits of a positive investment).
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in businesses with greater risk potential.2 29 Indeed, Clark USA's at-
torneys argued that a ruling in the plaintiff's favor would curtail busi-
ness investment in Illinois.230 The concurrence addressed the effect of
Forsythe on business, but was satisfied that the court's decision would
not harm investment in Illinois.231
At the least, it appears that Forsythe poses obstacles for both plain-
tiffs and defendants. While Sargent illustrates that the Forsythe rule is
not necessarily more helpful to plaintiffs than the doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil, parent corporations face uncertainty when attempt-
ing to limit tort liability because Forsythe blurred the distinction be-
tween direct participant liability and piercing the corporate veil.2 32
Consequently, Forsythe will ultimately disappoint both plaintiffs and
defendants who dispute the proper scope of liability for parent
corporations.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the preceding criticisms, the Forsythe decision does not re-
present a momentous change in corporate liability. The Illinois Su-
preme Court certified an idea that federal courts and other states had
already accepted. 233 What Forsythe lacked, however, was a more
thoughtful approach that could have improved corporate law in Illi-
nois. First, the court should have followed the decisions of the Waste
Management and Coastal Corp. courts and rejected the plaintiffs' ar-
gument that Clark USA's budgetary control over Clark Refining pro-
vided a sufficient basis for parent corporation liability.234 Granting
summary judgment in Clark USA's favor based on the insufficiency of
budgetary mismanagement allegations would have provided clear gui-
dance to parent corporations in their interactions with their subsidiar-
ies and established a clear precedent for lower courts. Second, the
court failed to create a meaningful difference between veil piercing
and direct participant liability, exacerbating confusion in corporate li-
ability. 235 The court could have avoided this problem by requiring the
plaintiffs to pierce the corporate veil to recover from Clark USA and
ruling that parent corporations should be more vulnerable than indi-
229. See Presser, supra note 34, at 156.
230. Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant Clark USA, Inc., supra note 119, at 33.
231. Forsythe, 864 N.E.2d at 244-45 (Freeman, J., concurring).
232. See Sargent v. Cassens Corp., No. 06-cv-1042-MJR, 2007 WL 1673289, at *7 (S.D. I11.
June 7, 2007).
233. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
234. See Coastal Corp. v. Torres, 133 S.W.3d 776 (Tex. App. 2004); Waste Mgmt. Inc. v. Super.
Ct., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 910 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
235. See Gevurtz, supra note 153, at 853.
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vidual shareholders in a veil piercing analysis. In doing so, the court
would have struck the correct balance between corporate protection
and fairness to tort plaintiffs. At present, it is unclear whether For-
sythe will change the way parent corporations do business in Illinois.
Regardless of the eventual impact of Forsythe, the Illinois Supreme
Court missed an opportunity to clarify and modernize corporate law
in Illinois.
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